miguan v1

This commit is contained in:
tamakyi
2026-10-21 12:09:28 +08:00
parent 2d4609dc0e
commit 79051acae8
28 changed files with 2128 additions and 182 deletions
+277
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@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
// Copyright 2026 tamakyi. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/urfave/cli/v2"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/conf"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/db"
)
// Honeypot 提供蜜罐取证命令(只读 + 一条显式清理)。
//
// TamaBox honeypot hits --since 24h 列出捕获到的破解凭据
// TamaBox honeypot stats --days 7 统计来源/路径/凭据排行
// TamaBox honeypot prune --days 30 清理过期记录(保留期由配置决定)
//
// 密码默认脱敏:CLI 输出会被贴到工单、聊天窗口甚至截图里,
// 明文只在确有取证需要时用 --show-password 显式打开。
var Honeypot = &cli.Command{
Name: "honeypot",
Usage: "Inspect honeypot hits (fake admin login page credential capture)",
Subcommands: []*cli.Command{
{
Name: "hits",
Usage: "List captured credential submissions",
Flags: []cli.Flag{
&cli.StringFlag{Name: "since", Value: "24h", Usage: "Time window, e.g. 24h / 7d / 30m"},
&cli.IntFlag{Name: "limit", Value: 50, Usage: "Max rows to print"},
&cli.StringFlag{Name: "ip", Usage: "Only show hits from this source IP"},
&cli.BoolFlag{Name: "show-password", Usage: "Print passwords in plaintext (default: masked)"},
},
Action: runHoneypotHits,
},
{
Name: "stats",
Usage: "Show honeypot statistics (top sources / paths / credentials)",
Flags: []cli.Flag{
&cli.IntFlag{Name: "days", Value: 7, Usage: "Statistics window in days"},
&cli.IntFlag{Name: "limit", Value: 20, Usage: "Max rows per section"},
&cli.BoolFlag{Name: "show-password", Usage: "Print passwords in plaintext (default: masked)"},
},
Action: runHoneypotStats,
},
{
Name: "prune",
Usage: "Delete honeypot records older than the retention period",
Flags: []cli.Flag{
&cli.IntFlag{Name: "days", Value: 0, Usage: "Days to keep (0 = use honeypot_retain_days from config)"},
&cli.BoolFlag{Name: "yes", Usage: "Skip confirmation"},
},
Action: runHoneypotPrune,
},
},
}
// parseSince 解析 --since 参数,支持 30m / 24h / 7d / 2w。
func parseSince(s string) (time.Duration, error) {
s = strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(s))
if s == "" {
return 24 * time.Hour, nil
}
unit := s[len(s)-1]
numPart := s[:len(s)-1]
var mult time.Duration
switch unit {
case 'm':
mult = time.Minute
case 'h':
mult = time.Hour
case 'd':
mult = 24 * time.Hour
case 'w':
mult = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
default:
return 0, errors.Errorf("invalid --since value %q (expect e.g. 30m / 24h / 7d)", s)
}
var n int
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(numPart, "%d", &n); err != nil || n <= 0 {
return 0, errors.Errorf("invalid --since value %q", s)
}
return time.Duration(n) * mult, nil
}
func runHoneypotHits(ctx *cli.Context) error {
dur, err := parseSince(ctx.String("since"))
if err != nil {
return err
}
database, err := openDatabase()
if err != nil {
return err
}
store := db.NewHoneypotStore(database)
since := time.Now().Add(-dur)
rows, err := store.ListSince(context.Background(), since, ctx.Int("limit"))
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "query honeypot hits")
}
filterIP := strings.TrimSpace(ctx.String("ip"))
showPwd := ctx.Bool("show-password")
fmt.Printf("蜜罐命中记录(近 %s,共 %d 条)\n", dur, len(rows))
fmt.Println(strings.Repeat("-", 72))
if len(rows) == 0 {
fmt.Println(" 无")
return nil
}
for _, r := range rows {
if filterIP != "" && r.IP != filterIP {
continue
}
pwd := r.Password
if pwd == "" {
pwd = "(空)"
} else if !showPwd {
pwd = maskSecret(pwd)
}
user := r.Username
if user == "" {
user = "(空)"
}
fmt.Printf("%s %-8s %-6s %s\n", r.CreatedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"), r.IP, r.Method, truncateForCLI(r.Path, 48))
fmt.Printf(" 用户名:%s 密码:%s\n", truncateForCLI(user, 64), truncateForCLI(pwd, 64))
if r.Provider != "" {
fmt.Printf(" 归属:%s%s\n", r.Provider, proxiedSuffix(r.Proxied))
}
if r.UserAgent != "" {
fmt.Printf(" UA:%s\n", truncateForCLI(r.UserAgent, 96))
}
if r.Banned {
fmt.Printf(" 处置:已触发封禁\n")
}
fmt.Println()
}
if !showPwd {
fmt.Println("提示:密码默认脱敏。需要明文时加 --show-password。")
}
return nil
}
func runHoneypotStats(ctx *cli.Context) error {
days := ctx.Int("days")
if days <= 0 {
days = 7
}
database, err := openDatabase()
if err != nil {
return err
}
store := db.NewHoneypotStore(database)
cctx := context.Background()
since := time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, -days)
total, err := store.CountSince(cctx, since)
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "count honeypot hits")
}
sources, err := store.TopSources(cctx, since, ctx.Int("limit"))
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "query top sources")
}
paths, err := store.TopPaths(cctx, since, ctx.Int("limit"))
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "query top paths")
}
creds, err := store.TopCredentials(cctx, since, ctx.Int("limit"))
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "query top credentials")
}
fmt.Printf("蜜罐统计:近 %d 天,共 %d 次命中\n", days, total)
fmt.Println(strings.Repeat("-", 72))
fmt.Println("来源 IP 排行:")
if len(sources) == 0 {
fmt.Println(" 无")
}
for i, s := range sources {
fmt.Printf(" %2d. %-40s %5d 次 %s\n", i+1, s.IP, s.Count, s.Provider)
}
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println("被探测路径排行:")
if len(paths) == 0 {
fmt.Println(" 无")
}
for i, p := range paths {
fmt.Printf(" %2d. %-50s %5d 次\n", i+1, truncateForCLI(p.Path, 50), p.Count)
}
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println("最常被尝试的凭据组合:")
if len(creds) == 0 {
fmt.Println(" 无")
}
showPwd := ctx.Bool("show-password")
for i, c := range creds {
pwd := c.Password
if pwd == "" {
pwd = "(空)"
} else if !showPwd {
pwd = maskSecret(pwd)
}
user := c.Username
if user == "" {
user = "(空)"
}
fmt.Printf(" %2d. %-30s %-30s %5d 次\n", i+1, truncateForCLI(user, 30), truncateForCLI(pwd, 30), c.Count)
}
if !showPwd {
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println("提示:密码默认脱敏。需要明文时加 --show-password。")
}
return nil
}
func runHoneypotPrune(ctx *cli.Context) error {
days := ctx.Int("days")
if days <= 0 {
days = conf.Security.HoneypotRetainDays
}
if days <= 0 {
days = 30
}
database, err := openDatabase()
if err != nil {
return err
}
before := time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, -days)
if !ctx.Bool("yes") {
fmt.Printf("将删除 %s 之前的蜜罐记录(共保留 %d 天)。\n", before.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"), days)
fmt.Print("确认继续?输入 yes 继续:")
var answer string
if _, err := fmt.Scanln(&answer); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "yes" {
fmt.Println("已取消。")
return nil
}
}
store := db.NewHoneypotStore(database)
n, err := store.DeleteBefore(context.Background(), before)
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "prune honeypot records")
}
fmt.Printf("已删除 %d 条过期蜜罐记录。\n", n)
return nil
}
// maskSecret 对密码做保长脱敏:保留首尾各 1 位,中间固定长度星号。
// 目的是让运维能分辨「是不是同一个密码」,但不把字典直接摊在终端上。
func maskSecret(s string) string {
r := []rune(s)
switch {
case len(r) <= 2:
return strings.Repeat("*", len(r))
case len(r) <= 6:
return string(r[0]) + strings.Repeat("*", len(r)-2) + string(r[len(r)-1])
default:
return string(r[0]) + strings.Repeat("*", 6) + string(r[len(r)-1])
}
}
func proxiedSuffix(proxied bool) string {
if proxied {
return "(CDN/代理出口)"
}
return ""
}
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@@ -78,7 +78,15 @@ var (
// 个人实名账号即可开通)/ auto(默认,留空同义:七牛优先、阿里云复核)。
// 仅显式选定的通道会被调用,缺凭据时启动即报错(见 conf.Init)——
// 审核失败是 fail-closed(拒绝提交),会让发布与私信整站不可用且现象隐蔽。
TextCensorSource string `ini:"text_censor_source"`
TextCensorSource string `ini:"text_censor_source"`
// EnableHoneypot 开启「虚假后台登录界面」蜜罐:扫描器探测后台路径时
// 返回一个仿 WordPress 的假登录页,并记录其提交的用户名/密码等破解信息。
// 仅在「无任何路由匹配」的路径上生效,与真实业务路由零交集。
EnableHoneypot bool `ini:"enable_honeypot"`
// HoneypotPaths 追加自定义诱饵路径(逗号分隔),与内置清单并集。
HoneypotPaths string `ini:"honeypot_paths"`
// HoneypotRetainDays 蜜罐命中记录的保留天数,到期由 CLI 清理。
HoneypotRetainDays int `ini:"honeypot_retain_days"`
SecurityAlertEmail string `ini:"security_alert_email"` // 触发封禁时告警收件人(留空不发送)
}
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@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ var AllTables = []interface{}{
&FeatureControl{},
// 站方处置与举报(无管理后台,处置经 CLI 写入、运行时读表生效)
&UserRestriction{}, &ContentReport{},
// 蜜罐命中记录(审计证据,只追加不软删)
&HoneypotHit{},
}
func Init(typ, dsn string) (*gorm.DB, error) {
@@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ func Init(typ, dsn string) (*gorm.DB, error) {
FeatureControls = NewFeatureControlsStore(db)
Restrictions = NewRestrictionsStore(db)
Reports = NewReportsStore(db)
Honeypots = NewHoneypotStore(db)
if err := db.Use(otelgorm.NewPlugin(
otelgorm.WithDBName(conf.Database.Name),
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@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
// Copyright 2026 tamakyi. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package db
import (
"context"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// HoneypotHit 是一次蜜罐命中记录(审计证据)。
//
// 刻意不嵌 dbutil.Model:审计证据不做软删除、不做 Update/Delete,
// 只追加与查询。理由与 ContentReport 一致 —— 证据链一旦被软删除过滤,
// 事后追责就断了。
type HoneypotHit struct {
ID uint `gorm:"primarykey" json:"id"`
CreatedAt time.Time `gorm:"index" json:"created_at"`
// IP 为归一化后的客户端 IP(shared.LimitKey 之后,IPv6 折叠到 /64)。
IP string `gorm:"size:64;index" json:"ip"`
// Method 与 Path 记录原始请求方法与路径(未归一化的原始值)。
Method string `gorm:"size:16" json:"method"`
Path string `gorm:"size:512" json:"path"`
// Query 保存原始查询串(截断)。
Query string `gorm:"size:1024" json:"query"`
// Username / Password 为提取出的破解凭据。Password 落库前做可逆加密还是脱敏,
// 由调用方决定:这里只存明文,CLI 展示时默认脱敏。
Username string `gorm:"size:256" json:"username"`
Password string `gorm:"size:256" json:"password"`
// Fields 保存其余表单/JSON 字段(JSON 字符串),便于还原破解工具特征。
Fields string `gorm:"type:text" json:"fields"`
// RawBody 保存截断后的原始 body。
RawBody string `gorm:"type:text" json:"raw_body"`
// HadFields 标记本次提交是否真的带了凭据字段(区分「探测 GET」与「尝试破解 POST」)。
HadFields bool `json:"had_fields"`
// UserAgent / Referer / ContentType 用于扫描器画像。
UserAgent string `gorm:"size:512" json:"user_agent"`
Referer string `gorm:"size:512" json:"referer"`
ContentType string `gorm:"size:256" json:"content_type"`
// Provider 为 IP 归属(云厂商/CDN/WAF)标签,Proxied 表示是否经代理。
Provider string `gorm:"size:64;index" json:"provider"`
Proxied bool `json:"proxied"`
// Banned 为命中时是否触发了封禁。
Banned bool `json:"banned"`
}
// TableName 固定表名,避免 GORM 复数化差异。
func (HoneypotHit) TableName() string { return "honeypot_hits" }
// Honeypots 蜜罐命中记录全局 store,由 db.Init 装配。
var Honeypots HoneypotStore
// HoneypotStore 蜜罐命中记录的读写。
type HoneypotStore interface {
// Create 追加一条命中记录。
Create(ctx context.Context, hit *HoneypotHit) error
// ListSince 返回 since 之后的命中记录,按时间倒序,最多 limit 条。
ListSince(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotHit, error)
// CountSince 统计 since 之后的命中总数。
CountSince(ctx context.Context, since time.Time) (int64, error)
// TopSources 返回 since 之后命中次数最多的来源 IP。
TopSources(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotSourceStat, error)
// TopPaths 返回 since 之后被命中次数最多的路径。
TopPaths(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotPathStat, error)
// TopCredentials 返回 since 之后最常被尝试的用户名/密码组合。
TopCredentials(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotCredentialStat, error)
// DeleteBefore 清理 before 之前的记录(保留期到期),返回删除行数。
DeleteBefore(ctx context.Context, before time.Time) (int64, error)
}
// HoneypotSourceStat 来源 IP 聚合行。
type HoneypotSourceStat struct {
IP string
Count int64
Provider string
}
// HoneypotPathStat 路径聚合行。
type HoneypotPathStat struct {
Path string
Count int64
}
// HoneypotCredentialStat 凭据组合聚合行。
type HoneypotCredentialStat struct {
Username string
Password string
Count int64
}
type honeypots struct {
db *gorm.DB
}
// NewHoneypotStore 构造蜜罐记录 store。
func NewHoneypotStore(db *gorm.DB) HoneypotStore {
return &honeypots{db: db}
}
func (h *honeypots) Create(ctx context.Context, hit *HoneypotHit) error {
if hit == nil {
return nil
}
return h.db.WithContext(ctx).Create(hit).Error
}
func (h *honeypots) ListSince(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotHit, error) {
if limit <= 0 || limit > 1000 {
limit = 200
}
var rows []*HoneypotHit
err := h.db.WithContext(ctx).
Where("created_at >= ?", since).
Order("created_at DESC").
Limit(limit).
Find(&rows).Error
return rows, err
}
func (h *honeypots) CountSince(ctx context.Context, since time.Time) (int64, error) {
var n int64
err := h.db.WithContext(ctx).Model(&HoneypotHit{}).
Where("created_at >= ?", since).
Count(&n).Error
return n, err
}
func (h *honeypots) TopSources(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotSourceStat, error) {
if limit <= 0 || limit > 500 {
limit = 20
}
var rows []*HoneypotSourceStat
err := h.db.WithContext(ctx).
Table("honeypot_hits").
Select("ip AS ip, count(*) AS count, max(provider) AS provider").
Where("created_at >= ?", since).
Group("ip").
Order("count DESC").
Limit(limit).
Scan(&rows).Error
return rows, err
}
func (h *honeypots) TopPaths(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotPathStat, error) {
if limit <= 0 || limit > 500 {
limit = 20
}
var rows []*HoneypotPathStat
err := h.db.WithContext(ctx).
Table("honeypot_hits").
Select("path AS path, count(*) AS count").
Where("created_at >= ?", since).
Group("path").
Order("count DESC").
Limit(limit).
Scan(&rows).Error
return rows, err
}
func (h *honeypots) TopCredentials(ctx context.Context, since time.Time, limit int) ([]*HoneypotCredentialStat, error) {
if limit <= 0 || limit > 500 {
limit = 20
}
var rows []*HoneypotCredentialStat
err := h.db.WithContext(ctx).
Table("honeypot_hits").
Select("username AS username, password AS password, count(*) AS count").
Where("created_at >= ?", since).
Where("username <> '' OR password <> ''").
Group("username, password").
Order("count DESC").
Limit(limit).
Scan(&rows).Error
return rows, err
}
func (h *honeypots) DeleteBefore(ctx context.Context, before time.Time) (int64, error) {
res := h.db.WithContext(ctx).Where("created_at < ?", before).Delete(&HoneypotHit{})
return res.RowsAffected, res.Error
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
// Copyright 2026 tamakyi. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package db
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestHoneypotStore 覆盖蜜罐命中记录的写入、检索与聚合。
//
// 重点验证「只追加」的审计语义:DeleteBefore 只按时间删,不做软删除;
// 以及 TopCredentials 能把攻击者正在用的字典聚合出来。
func TestHoneypotStore(t *testing.T) {
database, cleanup := newTestDB(t)
ctx := context.Background()
t.Cleanup(func() {
if err := cleanup("honeypot_hits"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
})
store := NewHoneypotStore(database)
now := time.Now()
rows := []*HoneypotHit{
{IP: "1.2.3.4", Method: "GET", Path: "/wp-admin", Provider: "Azure", CreatedAt: now.Add(-3 * time.Hour)},
{IP: "1.2.3.4", Method: "POST", Path: "/wp-login.php", Username: "admin", Password: "admin123", HadFields: true, CreatedAt: now.Add(-2 * time.Hour)},
{IP: "1.2.3.4", Method: "POST", Path: "/wp-login.php", Username: "admin", Password: "admin123", HadFields: true, CreatedAt: now.Add(-time.Hour)},
{IP: "5.6.7.8", Method: "POST", Path: "/.ssh/id_rsa", Username: "root", Password: "toor", HadFields: true, CreatedAt: now.Add(-30 * time.Minute)},
}
for _, r := range rows {
require.NoError(t, store.Create(ctx, r))
}
since := now.Add(-4 * time.Hour)
total, err := store.CountSince(ctx, since)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, int64(4), total)
list, err := store.ListSince(ctx, since, 10)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, list, 4)
// 倒序返回
require.Equal(t, "5.6.7.8", list[0].IP)
sources, err := store.TopSources(ctx, since, 10)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, sources, 2)
require.Equal(t, "1.2.3.4", sources[0].IP)
require.Equal(t, int64(3), sources[0].Count)
require.Equal(t, "Azure", sources[0].Provider)
paths, err := store.TopPaths(ctx, since, 10)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, paths, 3)
require.Equal(t, "/wp-login.php", paths[0].Path)
require.Equal(t, int64(2), paths[0].Count)
creds, err := store.TopCredentials(ctx, since, 10)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, creds, 2)
require.Equal(t, "admin", creds[0].Username)
require.Equal(t, "admin123", creds[0].Password)
require.Equal(t, int64(2), creds[0].Count)
// 保留期清理
deleted, err := store.DeleteBefore(ctx, now.Add(-90*time.Minute))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, int64(2), deleted) // 3 小时前、2 小时前两条被清
total, err = store.CountSince(ctx, since)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, int64(2), total)
}
+47
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@@ -113,6 +113,53 @@ func SendSecurityAlertMail(ip, provider string, proxied bool, samplePaths []stri
return sendTemplateMail(conf.Security.SecurityAlertEmail, "【狼的提问箱】检测到疑似批量扫描,已自动封禁 IP", templates.FS, "mail/security-alert.html", params)
}
// HoneypotAlert 蜜罐捕获到破解尝试时的告警载荷。
type HoneypotAlert struct {
IP string
Provider string
Proxied bool
Path string
Username string
Password string
Banned bool
DurationMin int
}
// SendHoneypotAlertMail 发送「蜜罐捕获到破解尝试」告警。
//
// 与 SendSecurityAlertMail 共用 conf.Security.SecurityAlertEmail 收件人,不新增配置项。
// 邮件中直接给出捕获到的用户名/密码:这是本功能的核心价值(拿到攻击者正在用的字典),
// 但也意味着这封邮件是敏感物 —— 收件人应当只有运维本人,不要转发到公共群组。
func SendHoneypotAlertMail(a HoneypotAlert) error {
proxyHint := ""
if a.Proxied {
proxyHint = "1"
}
disposition := "已记录,未触发封禁"
if a.Banned {
disposition = fmt.Sprintf("已记录并自动临时封禁 %d 分钟", a.DurationMin)
}
password := a.Password
if password == "" {
password = "(空)"
}
username := a.Username
if username == "" {
username = "(空)"
}
params := map[string]string{
"ip": a.IP,
"provider": a.Provider,
"proxy_hint": proxyHint,
"path": a.Path,
"username": username,
"password": password,
"disposition": disposition,
"time": time.Now().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"),
}
return sendTemplateMail(conf.Security.SecurityAlertEmail, "【狼的提问箱】蜜罐捕获到后台破解尝试", templates.FS, "mail/honeypot-alert.html", params)
}
// SendAbuseAlertMail 发送「某箱主收到集中举报」的阈值告警。
//
// 与 SendSecurityAlertMail 共用 conf.Security.SecurityAlertEmail 收件人,不新增配置项。
+8 -3
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"github.com/flamego/flamego"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/autoban"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/honeypot"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/shared"
)
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ import (
// - 真正的 404 探测由 f.NotFound 处理器单独计数(见 route.go),
// 不再把业务性的"302 → /"(语言切换 / 登出 / 投票不存在 / 黑名单跳转等)误判为扫描。
// - 核心检测逻辑见 internal/security/autoban(可独立测试);告警发送函数由本层注入。
func autobanMiddleware(b *autoban.Banner) flamego.Handler {
func autobanMiddleware(b *autoban.Banner, hp *honeypot.Honeypot) flamego.Handler {
return func(ctx flamego.Context) {
// 经 shared.LimitKey 归一化后再计数与判定:IPv4 原样,IPv6 聚合到 /64。
// 否则攻击者可在单个 /64 内轮换地址,使每个键只命中一次而永不触发阈值。
@@ -32,8 +33,12 @@ func autobanMiddleware(b *autoban.Banner) flamego.Handler {
path := ctx.Request().URL.Path
kind := autoban.KindNone
if autoban.IsSensitivePath(path) {
kind = autoban.KindSensitive
// 蜜罐命中的路径由蜜罐处理器自己计数(它需要同时知道「是否触发了封禁」
// 以便落库)。若这里再记一次,同一次请求会被计两遍,阈值实际减半。
if hp == nil || !hp.Match(path) {
if autoban.IsSensitivePath(path) {
kind = autoban.KindSensitive
}
}
if kind != autoban.KindNone {
defer b.Record(ip, path, kind)
+261
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
// Copyright 2026 tamakyi. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package route
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/flamego/flamego"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/conf"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/db"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/mail"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/autoban"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/honeypot"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/ipinfo"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/shared"
)
// honeypotHandler 蜜罐处理器:只在「无任何路由匹配」的路径上生效。
//
// 与真实业务路由(/login、/register、/_/{domain}、/user/**、/api/v1/**)天然零交集,
// 因为它挂在 f.NotFound 上 —— flamego 只有在路由表完全落空时才会走到这里。
//
// 行为:
// - GET → 返回仿 WordPress 的假登录页(200),让扫描器判定「后台存在」;
// - POST → 解析并记录提交的用户名/密码,返回「用户名或密码无效」的假响应;
// - 无论 GET/POST → 计入 autoban 敏感路径统计,达到阈值即临时封禁 + 邮件告警;
// - 绝不调用 ctx.Next(),不查业务表、不渲染业务模板。
type honeypotHandler struct {
hp *honeypot.Honeypot
ab *autoban.Banner
// store 允许为 nil(单测 / 未装配 DB 时降级为只记录日志)。
store db.HoneypotStore
// sendAlert 发送「捕获到破解尝试」的告警邮件。nil 则不发。
sendAlert func(mail.HoneypotAlert) error
// alerted 保证同一个 IP 只告警一次(与 autoban 的告警去重口径一致),
// 避免暴力破解脚本在封禁前反复提交把邮箱打爆。
alerted map[string]bool
alertedMu sync.Mutex
}
// newHoneypotHandler 构造蜜罐处理器。
func newHoneypotHandler(hp *honeypot.Honeypot, ab *autoban.Banner, store db.HoneypotStore) *honeypotHandler {
return &honeypotHandler{
hp: hp,
ab: ab,
store: store,
alerted: map[string]bool{},
}
}
// Serve 处理一次蜜罐命中。
func (h *honeypotHandler) Serve(ctx flamego.Context) {
req := ctx.Request().Request
ip := shared.LimitKey(shared.ResolveClientIP(req))
path := req.URL.Path
// 记录与封禁:走既有 autoban 链路,复用阈值封禁与告警。
banned := false
if h.ab != nil && ip != "" {
h.ab.Record(ip, path, autoban.KindSensitive)
// Record 内部在触发封禁时把 IP 写入 banned 表;此处再查一次得到确切状态。
banned = h.ab.IsBanned(ip)
}
// body 只能读一次:先提取凭据(POST 时读 body),再决定写哪种响应。
creds := h.hp.ExtractCredentials(req)
switch req.Method {
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead:
h.serveLoginPage(ctx, path)
case http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodPatch:
h.serveLoginFailure(ctx, path, honeypot.LoginFailureNotice)
default:
// 其他方法(PUT/DELETE/OPTIONS 等)返回一个无内容的假 200,模拟后端存在。
ctx.ResponseWriter().WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
// 落库留证。落库失败只记日志,绝不影响已写出的响应。
h.record(ip, req, path, creds, banned)
}
// serveLoginPage 返回假登录页。
func (h *honeypotHandler) serveLoginPage(ctx flamego.Context, path string) {
redir := ""
if q := ctx.Request().URL.Query().Get("redirect_to"); q != "" {
redir = q
}
honeypot.WriteLoginPage(ctx.ResponseWriter(), honeypot.LoginPageVars{
Action: path,
Title: "Log In ‹ WordPress",
Heading: "WordPress",
Redir: redir,
})
}
// serveLoginFailure 返回「登录失败」的假响应。
//
// 响应体刻意与真实 WordPress 的错误提示一致(同一句文案、不区分用户不存在与密码错误),
// 这样爆破脚本拿不到「用户名枚举」信号,也就无法优化字典;而我们照样拿到完整凭据。
func (h *honeypotHandler) serveLoginFailure(ctx flamego.Context, path string, notice string) {
body := honeypot.RenderLoginPage(honeypot.LoginPageVars{
Action: path,
Title: "Log In \u2039 WordPress",
Heading: "WordPress",
Notice: notice,
Redir: ctx.Request().URL.Query().Get("redirect_to"),
})
w := ctx.ResponseWriter()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate")
w.Header().Set("X-Robots-Tag", "noindex, nofollow")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write(body)
}
// record 追加一条命中记录。
func (h *honeypotHandler) record(ip string, req *http.Request, path string, creds honeypot.Credentials, banned bool) {
h.recordCredentials(ip, req, path, creds, banned)
}
// recordCredentials 把一次命中写入数据库。
func (h *honeypotHandler) recordCredentials(ip string, req *http.Request, path string, creds honeypot.Credentials, banned bool) {
provider, proxied := ipinfo.Lookup(ip)
fieldsJSON := ""
if len(creds.Fields) > 0 {
if b, err := json.Marshal(creds.Fields); err == nil {
fieldsJSON = string(b)
}
}
query := ""
if req.URL != nil {
query = req.URL.RawQuery
if len(query) > 1000 {
query = query[:1000]
}
}
hit := &db.HoneypotHit{
IP: ip,
Method: req.Method,
Path: path,
Query: query,
Username: creds.Username,
Password: creds.Password,
Fields: fieldsJSON,
RawBody: creds.RawBody,
HadFields: creds.HadFields,
UserAgent: truncate(req.UserAgent(), 500),
Referer: truncate(req.Referer(), 500),
ContentType: truncate(req.Header.Get("Content-Type"), 250),
Provider: provider,
Proxied: proxied,
Banned: banned,
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
}
// 只有真的提交了凭据才告警:纯路径探测(GET)没有取证价值,
// 而爆破脚本往往在封禁前反复 POST,只告警一次即可。
if creds.HadFields {
h.alert(ip, req, path, creds, provider, proxied, banned)
}
// 有凭据的提交才是高价值证据,日志里点名;纯探测只记路径。
if creds.HadFields {
logrus.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"ip": ip,
"path": path,
"username": creds.Username,
"banned": banned,
}).Warn("honeypot: credential submission captured")
}
if h.store == nil {
return
}
// 用独立超时上下文,避免请求被取消时取证写不进去。
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := h.store.Create(ctx, hit); err != nil {
logrus.WithError(err).WithField("ip", ip).WithField("path", path).
Warn("honeypot: failed to persist hit")
}
}
// alert 发送一次告警邮件(每个 IP 只发一次)。
func (h *honeypotHandler) alert(ip string, req *http.Request, path string, creds honeypot.Credentials, provider string, proxied, banned bool) {
if h.sendAlert == nil || ip == "" {
return
}
h.alertedMu.Lock()
if h.alerted[ip] {
h.alertedMu.Unlock()
return
}
h.alerted[ip] = true
h.alertedMu.Unlock()
durationMin := conf.Security.BanDurationMinutes
if durationMin <= 0 {
durationMin = 15
}
go func() {
if err := h.sendAlert(mail.HoneypotAlert{
IP: ip,
Provider: provider,
Proxied: proxied,
Path: path,
Username: creds.Username,
Password: creds.Password,
Banned: banned,
DurationMin: durationMin,
}); err != nil {
logrus.WithError(err).WithField("ip", ip).Warn("honeypot: failed to send alert mail")
}
}()
}
// truncate 截断字符串到指定长度(按 rune,避免截断多字节字符)。
func truncate(s string, n int) string {
if n <= 0 {
return ""
}
r := []rune(s)
if len(r) <= n {
return s
}
return string(r[:n])
}
// honeypotExtraPaths 解析配置中的自定义诱饵路径(逗号/分号/换行分隔)。
func honeypotExtraPaths(raw string) []string {
if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
return nil
}
fields := strings.FieldsFunc(raw, func(r rune) bool {
return r == ',' || r == ';' || r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == ' ' || r == '\t'
})
out := make([]string, 0, len(fields))
for _, f := range fields {
f = strings.TrimSpace(f)
if f == "" {
continue
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(f, "/") {
f = "/" + f
}
out = append(out, f)
}
return out
}
+168
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
// Copyright 2026 tamakyi. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package route
import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/flamego/flamego"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/autoban"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/honeypot"
)
// newHoneypotTestServer 造一个只含蜜罐 NotFound 分流的最小 flamego 实例。
//
// 刻意不调用 route.New()(那会拉起 DB/Redis/session 依赖),而是复刻它的
// 关键结构:全局 Use 链 → 具体路由 → NotFound 蜜罐分流。
func newHoneypotTestServer(t *testing.T, enabled bool) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
f := flamego.New()
hp := honeypot.New(honeypot.Options{Enabled: enabled})
ab := autoban.New(autoban.Options{
Enabled: true,
ThresholdSensitive: 1, // 命中一次即封禁,便于断言
Window: 60,
Duration: 60,
})
hph := newHoneypotHandler(hp, ab, nil) // store=nil → 只走日志,不落库
f.Get("/login", func(ctx flamego.Context) {
ctx.ResponseWriter().WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = ctx.ResponseWriter().Write([]byte("REAL_LOGIN"))
})
f.Get("/api/v1/questions", func(ctx flamego.Context) {
ctx.ResponseWriter().WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = ctx.ResponseWriter().Write([]byte("REAL_API"))
})
f.NotFound(func(ctx flamego.Context) {
if hp.Match(ctx.Request().URL.Path) {
hph.Serve(ctx)
return
}
ctx.Redirect("/")
})
ts := httptest.NewServer(f)
t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
return ts
}
// TestHoneypotServesFakeLoginPage 验证:命中诱饵路径时返回假登录页(含 canary),
// 而不是 302 跳首页。
func TestHoneypotServesFakeLoginPage(t *testing.T) {
ts := newHoneypotTestServer(t, true)
resp, err := http.Get(ts.URL + "/wp-login.php")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200", resp.StatusCode)
}
if ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); !strings.HasPrefix(ct, "text/html") {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want text/html", ct)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(body), honeypot.CanaryToken) {
t.Error("假登录页缺少 canary 标记,无法溯源")
}
if !strings.Contains(string(body), `name="log"`) || !strings.Contains(string(body), `name="pwd"`) {
t.Error("假登录页应使用 WordPress 经典字段名 log / pwd")
}
if strings.Contains(string(body), "REAL_LOGIN") {
t.Error("假登录页不应包含真实业务内容")
}
}
// TestHoneypotDoesNotHijackRealRoutes 是红线测试:真实业务路由绝不能被蜜罐接管。
func TestHoneypotDoesNotHijackRealRoutes(t *testing.T) {
ts := newHoneypotTestServer(t, true)
for path, want := range map[string]string{
"/login": "REAL_LOGIN",
"/api/v1/questions": "REAL_API",
} {
resp, err := http.Get(ts.URL + path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
if !strings.Contains(string(body), want) {
t.Errorf("%s 返回了 %q,期望包含 %q(业务路由被劫持)", path, truncate(string(body), 80), want)
}
if strings.Contains(string(body), honeypot.CanaryToken) {
t.Errorf("%s 命中了蜜罐,业务路由被劫持", path)
}
}
}
// TestHoneypotDisabledFallsBackToRedirect 验证:蜜罐关闭时行为与原先一致(302 → /)。
func TestHoneypotDisabledFallsBackToRedirect(t *testing.T) {
ts := newHoneypotTestServer(t, false)
client := &http.Client{
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
}
resp, err := client.Get(ts.URL + "/wp-login.php")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusFound {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 302", resp.StatusCode)
}
if loc := resp.Header.Get("Location"); loc != "/" {
t.Errorf("Location = %q, want /", loc)
}
}
// TestHoneypotCapturesCredentials 验证:POST 提交的用户名/密码能被提取出来。
func TestHoneypotCapturesCredentials(t *testing.T) {
hp := honeypot.New(honeypot.Options{Enabled: true})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/wp-login.php",
strings.NewReader("log=admin&pwd=hunter2&redirect_to=%2Fwp-admin%2F"))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
creds := hp.ExtractCredentials(req)
if creds.Username != "admin" {
t.Errorf("Username = %q, want admin", creds.Username)
}
if creds.Password != "hunter2" {
t.Errorf("Password = %q, want hunter2", creds.Password)
}
}
// TestHoneypotPostReturnsFailurePage 验证:POST 后返回 200 的假登录页并带错误提示。
func TestHoneypotPostReturnsFailurePage(t *testing.T) {
ts := newHoneypotTestServer(t, true)
resp, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"/wp-login.php",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
strings.NewReader("log=admin&pwd=admin"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200", resp.StatusCode)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(body), honeypot.LoginFailureNotice) {
t.Error("提交凭据后应返回「用户名或密码无效」的假提示")
}
}
+38 -3
View File
@@ -26,11 +26,13 @@ import (
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/captcha"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/conf"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/context"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/db"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/form"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/i18n"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/mail"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/route/chat" // 私聊路由
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/autoban"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/honeypot"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/security/ipinfo"
"github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/shared"
templatepkg "github.com/tamakyi/TamaBox/internal/template"
@@ -96,6 +98,19 @@ func New() *flamego.Flame {
},
})
// 蜜罐(虚假后台登录界面):默认关闭,需在 [security] 段显式 enable_honeypot = true。
// 命中即返回假登录页 + 记录破解凭据 + 复用上面的 autoban 封禁/告警链路。
hp := honeypot.New(honeypot.Options{
Enabled: conf.Security.EnableHoneypot,
ExtraPaths: honeypotExtraPaths(conf.Security.HoneypotPaths),
})
hph := newHoneypotHandler(hp, ab, db.Honeypots)
// 蜜罐告警:只有真的提交了凭据才发(纯路径探测没有取证价值),且每个 IP 只发一次。
// 收件人复用 security_alert_email,不新增配置项。
hph.sendAlert = func(a mail.HoneypotAlert) error {
return mail.SendHoneypotAlertMail(a)
}
templateFS, err := template.EmbedFS(templates.FS, ".", []string{".html"})
if err != nil {
logrus.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to embed templates file system")
@@ -148,7 +163,7 @@ func New() *flamego.Flame {
f.Use(securityHeaders())
f.Use(ipBlacklistMiddleware())
f.Use(autobanMiddleware(ab))
f.Use(autobanMiddleware(ab, hp))
// 全局请求体上限:必须在任何会读取 body 的中间件(尤其 Contexter 内的 CSRF 校验)
// 之前执行,否则超大 multipart 会在 Bind 的路由级限制生效前落盘临时文件耗尽磁盘。
f.Use(requestBodyLimitMiddleware())
@@ -430,8 +445,28 @@ func New() *flamego.Flame {
context.Contexter(),
)
f.NotFound(func(ctx flamego.Context) {
// 真正的 404 探测在此记录(不把业务 302→/ 误判为扫描)。flamego 的 NotFound 会先
// 写 404 状态再 Redirect,故须在 Redirect 前记录。
// ── 蜜罐分流(优先)───────────────────────────────────────────────
// 命中诱饵路径(/wp-admin、/.ssh、/.env 等后台探测特征)时,返回一个
// 仿 WordPress 的假登录页,并把攻击者提交的凭据记录入库。
//
// 为什么挂在 NotFound 而不是全局中间件:NotFound 只在「路由表完全落空」
// 时触发,因此与 /login、/register、/_/{domain}、/user/**、/api/v1/** 等
// 真实业务路由天然零交集,不会劫持正常用户;且它位于全局 f.Use 链之后,
// requestBodyLimitMiddleware 已对 body 施加上限,解析 POST body 安全。
// 组级中间件(含 CSRF)只挂在具体路由上,不作用于 NotFound,故表单可解析。
//
// 短路:flamego 的 context.run() 在 ResponseWriter().Written() 为真时即
// return,故此处写完响应且不调用 ctx.Next() 即可安全终止整条链路。
if hp != nil && hp.Match(ctx.Request().URL.Path) {
hph.Serve(ctx)
return
}
// 真正的 404 探测在此记录(不把业务 302→/ 误判为扫描)。
// ⚠️ 更正:flamego 的 NotFound 处理器并不会自动写 404 状态码 ——
// ResponseWriter.Write() 在未显式 WriteHeader 时写的是 200,
// ctx.Redirect("/") 写的是 302 + Location: /。这里保持原有 302→/ 行为
// (对扫描器而言,302 到首页同样表示「此路径不存在」)。
// 键必须与 autobanMiddleware 的 IsBanned/Record 一致(同样经 LimitKey 聚合),
// 否则计数落在另一个键上,封禁永不生效。
// ⚠️ 计数受 ban_track_notfound 控制,默认关闭;Record 内部会忽略未开启的
+383
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
// Package honeypot 提供「虚假后台登录界面」诱饵能力。
//
// 设计原则(务必遵守):
// 1. 只返回假内容,绝不返回、绝不猜测任何真实凭据;
// 2. 只在 flamego 的 NotFound 分流点生效 —— 即「没有任何路由匹配」的路径,
// 因此与 /login、/register、/_/{domain}、/user/**、/api/v1/** 等真实业务
// 路由天然零交集,不会劫持正常用户;
// 3. 命中即短路:不查业务表、不渲染业务模板、不调用 ctx.Next()。
package honeypot
import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"path"
"regexp"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// CanaryToken 是所有假页面统一的溯源标记。它只会出现在诱饵响应里,
// 一旦在别处(真实页面、错误日志)出现即可判定为蜜罐泄漏/误挂。
const CanaryToken = "tb-hp-7f3a1c9e"
// maxCredentialFieldLen 限制单个凭据字段落库长度,避免超长 payload 撑爆表。
const maxCredentialFieldLen = 512
// honeypotPrefixes 为段前缀匹配的诱饵路径。取自 autoban.sensitivePaths 的语义,
// 但收敛为「与业务路由不可能同名」的一组,避免误伤。
var honeypotPrefixes = []string{
"/admin", "/administrator", "/wp-admin", "/wp-content", "/wp-includes",
"/wp-login", "/wp-login.php", "/wp-cron", "/wp-trackback", "/wp-comments-post",
"/wp-json", "/wp-config", "/wp-mail", "/wp-signup", "/wp-activate", "/wp-links-opml",
"/wp-blog-header", "/wp-load", "/wp-settings", "/wp-load.php", "/wp-settings.php",
"/xmlrpc", "/console", "/manager", "/manager/html", "/phpmyadmin", "/pma",
"/cpanel", "/plesk", "/webadmin", "/adminer", "/shell", "/cmd", "/eval",
"/webshell", "/cgi-bin", "/shell.php", "/admin.php", "/login.php",
"/.ssh", "/.aws", "/.env", "/.git", "/.svn", "/.hg", "/.docker",
"/.config", "/.npm", "/.kube", "/.vscode", "/.idea",
"/actuator", "/swagger", "/swagger-ui", "/openapi", "/v2/api-docs", "/v3/api-docs",
"/api-docs", "/druid", "/nacos", "/solr", "/elastic", "/apollo",
"/server-status", "/server-info", "/info.php", "/phpinfo", "/test.php",
"/backup", "/backups", "/dump", "/database", "/db", "/sql", "/mysql",
"/config", "/configuration", "/vendor", "/storage", "/tmp", "/temp",
"/upload", "/uploads", "/files", "/log", "/logs",
}
// honeypotFragments 为任意位置子串匹配的诱饵路径片段(大小写不敏感)。
var honeypotFragments = []string{
"/wp-admin", "/wp-login", "/wp-content", "/wp-includes", "/wp-json",
"/wp-config", "/xmlrpc.php", "/wordpress", "/phpmyadmin", "/cgi-bin/",
"/.git/", "/.env", "/.aws/", "/.ssh/", "/actuator/", "/swagger",
"/druid/", "/solr/", "/nacos/", "/vuln", "/shell?", "/cmd?",
"/.bak", "/.old", "/.orig", "/.save", "/.swp", "/.zip", "/.tar.gz", "/.sql",
}
// forbiddenPrefixes 是业务路由前缀:即便有人往诱饵表里塞了这些前缀,
// 匹配时也会被强制剔除,构成第二道保险。
var forbiddenPrefixes = []string{
"/login", "/register", "/logout", "/signup", "/sign-in", "/sign_up",
"/user", "/api", "/_", "/assets", "/static", "/css", "/js", "/images",
"/favicon", "/robots", "/sitemap", "/feed", "/rss", "/about", "/rules",
"/sponsor", "/change-logs", "/maintenance-mode", "/pixel",
}
// Options 是蜜罐行为配置。
type Options struct {
// Enabled 为false 时 Honeypot() 恒返回 nil(不接管任何路径)。
Enabled bool
// ExtraPaths 追加自定义诱饵路径(支持段前缀语义,写成 "/a/b" 即前缀匹配)。
ExtraPaths []string
// MaxPayloadBytes 单次可记录的用户名/密码等字段长度上限。
MaxPayloadBytes int
}
func (o Options) maxField() int {
if o.MaxPayloadBytes > 0 {
return o.MaxPayloadBytes
}
return maxCredentialFieldLen
}
// Honeypot 是蜜罐匹配器,构造后不可变,可安全并发使用。
type Honeypot struct {
enabled bool
prefix map[string]bool
maxField int
}
// New 构造蜜罐匹配器。ExtraPaths 会参与前缀匹配。
func New(o Options) *Honeypot {
h := &Honeypot{
enabled: o.Enabled,
prefix: make(map[string]bool, len(honeypotPrefixes)+len(o.ExtraPaths)),
maxField: o.maxField(),
}
for _, p := range honeypotPrefixes {
h.prefix[normalize(p)] = true
}
for _, p := range o.ExtraPaths {
if p = normalize(p); p != "" {
h.prefix[p] = true
}
}
return h
}
// Enabled 报告蜜罐是否启用。
func (h *Honeypot) Enabled() bool { return h != nil && h.enabled }
// normalize 归一化路径:小写、合并重复斜杠、去掉结尾斜杠(根除外)。
func normalize(p string) string {
p = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(p))
if p == "" {
return ""
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/") {
p = "/" + p
}
// 折叠重复斜杠
for strings.Contains(p, "//") {
p = strings.ReplaceAll(p, "//", "/")
}
for strings.HasSuffix(p, "/") && len(p) > 1 {
p = strings.TrimSuffix(p, "/")
}
return p
}
// Match 判断路径是否应被蜜罐接管。
//
// 归一化步骤:去查询串、URL 反解码一次(对抗 %2f 编码绕过)、折叠斜杠、
// 去掉尾部 /index.html 之类不影响结果的尾斜杠。
func (h *Honeypot) Match(rawPath string) bool {
if !h.Enabled() {
return false
}
p := normalizePath(rawPath)
if p == "" {
return false
}
for _, f := range forbiddenPrefixes {
if p == f || strings.HasPrefix(p, f+"/") {
// 业务路由,绝不接管
return false
}
}
if _, ok := h.prefix[p]; ok {
return true
}
// 段前缀:/wp-admin/install.php 命中 /wp-admin
segs := strings.Split(p, "/")
for i := 1; i < len(segs); i++ {
joined := strings.Join(segs[:i+1], "/")
if h.prefix[joined] {
return true
}
}
for _, f := range honeypotFragments {
if strings.Contains(p, f) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func normalizePath(raw string) string {
p := raw
// 去查询串与 fragment(畸形请求可能没有 '?',用 Cut 兜底)
if i := strings.IndexAny(p, "?#"); i >= 0 {
p = p[:i]
}
if p == "" {
return ""
}
// 反解码一次;失败(非法百分号编码)则用原串继续。
if dec, err := url.PathUnescape(p); err == nil && dec != "" {
p = dec
}
p = strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/")
return normalize(p)
}
// Credentials 是从一次诱饵提交中提取出的破解信息。
type Credentials struct {
Username string
Password string
Fields map[string]string
RawBody string
HadFields bool
}
// credentialKeys 是常见的用户名/密码字段名(表单 POST 与 JSON body 均适用)。
var credentialKeys = map[string]bool{
"log": true, "pwd": true, "username": true, "user": true, "pass": true,
"password": true, "passwd": true, "pw": true, "email": true, "name": true,
"account": true, "login": true, "wp_user": true, "user_login": true,
"wp_password": true, "uname": true, "nickname": true, "id": true, "token": true,
}
// ExtractCredentials 从请求中提取破解凭据。
//
// 同时支持三类来源,按优先级合并:
// 1. URL 查询串 / POST 表单字段(application/x-www-form-urlencoded、multipart);
// 2. JSON body({"username":"admin","password":"123456"});
// 3. Basic Auth 头。
//
// 永不 panic、永不因解析失败阻断响应。
func (h *Honeypot) ExtractCredentials(r *http.Request) Credentials {
out := Credentials{Fields: map[string]string{}}
limit := maxCredentialFieldLen
if h != nil && h.maxField > 0 {
limit = h.maxField
}
put := func(k, v string) {
k = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(k))
v = strings.TrimSpace(v)
if k == "" {
return
}
if len(v) > limit {
v = v[:limit]
}
if _, exists := out.Fields[k]; !exists {
out.Fields[k] = v
}
switch k {
case "log", "username", "user", "login", "user_login", "email", "account", "uname", "wp_user", "nickname":
if out.Username == "" {
out.Username = v
}
case "pwd", "password", "passwd", "pw", "pass", "wp_password", "token":
if out.Password == "" {
out.Password = v
}
}
}
// 1. 查询串
if r != nil && r.URL != nil {
for k, vs := range r.URL.Query() {
if len(vs) > 0 {
put(k, vs[0])
}
}
}
if r == nil || r.Body == nil {
out.finish()
return out
}
if r.Body != nil {
defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
}
// 全量读取(bodylimit 中间件已对非 GET 请求施加上限,这里再做一层防御)
buf := make([]byte, 0, 1024)
tmp := make([]byte, 4096)
reader := r.Body
for {
n, err := reader.Read(tmp)
if n > 0 {
if len(buf)+n > limit*8 {
buf = append(buf, tmp[:n]...)
break
}
buf = append(buf, tmp[:n]...)
}
if err != nil {
break
}
}
raw := string(buf)
if len(raw) > limit {
raw = raw[:limit]
}
out.RawBody = raw
ct := strings.ToLower(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
switch {
case strings.Contains(ct, "json"):
parseJSONCredentials(raw, put)
default:
// ParseQuery 遇到非法百分号编码会返回 error,但仍会给出已成功解析的部分字段。
// 蜜罐要的是「尽可能多拿到凭据」,故忽略 error 继续用部分结果。
vals, _ := url.ParseQuery(raw)
if len(vals) > 0 {
for k, vs := range vals {
if len(vs) > 0 {
put(k, vs[0])
}
}
} else {
// 完全不像表单时再按 JSON 试一次。
parseJSONCredentials(raw, put)
}
}
// 3. Basic Auth
if user, pass, ok := r.BasicAuth(); ok {
put("username", user)
put("password", pass)
}
out.finish()
return out
}
// finish 依据 Fields 补齐 Username/Password,并置 HadFields。
func (c *Credentials) finish() {
for k, v := range c.Fields {
if credentialKeys[k] && v != "" {
c.HadFields = true
}
}
if c.Username == "" || c.Password == "" {
for k, v := range c.Fields {
if v == "" {
continue
}
if c.Username == "" && !isPasswordKey(k) {
if credentialKeys[k] {
c.Username = v
}
}
if c.Password == "" && isPasswordKey(k) {
c.Password = v
}
}
}
if c.Username != "" || c.Password != "" {
c.HadFields = true
}
}
func isPasswordKey(k string) bool {
switch k {
case "pwd", "password", "passwd", "pw", "pass", "wp_password", "token":
return true
}
return false
}
// jsonPairRe 匹配 JSON 扁平字段:"key": value(value 可为字符串/数字/布尔/null)。
// 只取第一层深度已足够覆盖 {"username":"admin","password":123456} 这类破解 payload;
// 嵌套对象/数组的内部内容不作为凭据,避免把无关结构误记成密码。
var jsonPairRe = regexp.MustCompile(`"([A-Za-z0-9_.\-]{1,64})"\s*:\s*("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"|-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?|true|false|null)`)
// parseJSONCredentials 极简 JSON 字段提取,容忍不规范 body,永不 panic。
func parseJSONCredentials(raw string, put func(k, v string)) {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" || (raw[0] != '{' && raw[0] != '[') {
return
}
for _, m := range jsonPairRe.FindAllStringSubmatch(raw, -1) {
k := strings.TrimSpace(m[1])
v := strings.TrimSpace(m[2])
if len(v) >= 2 && v[0] == '"' {
if s, err := strconv.Unquote(v); err == nil {
v = s
} else {
v = strings.Trim(v, `"`)
}
}
if v == "null" {
v = ""
}
put(k, v)
}
}
// Describer 返回 Honeypot 的可读描述,供 CLI / 排障使用。
func (h *Honeypot) Describer() string {
if h == nil || !h.enabled {
return "disabled"
}
keys := make([]string, 0, len(h.prefix))
for k := range h.prefix {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
return path.Join(keys...)
}
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package honeypot
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestMatch(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
hit := []string{
"/wp-admin", "/wp-admin/install.php", "/wp-login.php", "/wp-content/plugins/",
"/.ssh/id_rsa", "/.env", "/.git/config", "/.aws/credentials",
"/administrator", "/phpmyadmin", "/actuator/env", "/swagger-ui.html",
"/xmlrpc.php", "/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php",
"/wp-admin/../wp-content/x.php",
}
for _, p := range hit {
if !h.Match(p) {
t.Errorf("Match(%q) = false, want true", p)
}
}
// 业务路由必须一律不接管 —— 这是蜜罐的红线。
miss := []string{
"/", "/login", "/register", "/logout", "/_/alice", "/user", "/user/settings",
"/api/v1/questions", "/static/css/base.css", "/favicon.ico", "/robots.txt",
"/about", "/rules", "/sponsor", "/change-logs.html", "/vote/abc",
"/explore", "/i18n/en",
}
for _, p := range miss {
if h.Match(p) {
t.Errorf("Match(%q) = true, want false(业务路由不得被蜜罐接管)", p)
}
}
}
func TestMatchDisabled(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: false})
if h.Match("/wp-admin") {
t.Error("蜜罐未启用时不应匹配任何路径")
}
}
func TestMatchEncoded(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
// %2f 编码绕过
if !h.Match("/wp-admin%2f..%2fetc") {
t.Error("编码后的 wp-admin 路径应被匹配")
}
// 大小写
if !h.Match("/WP-ADMIN") {
t.Error("大小写不同的 WP-ADMIN 应被匹配")
}
// 查询串不应影响判定
if !h.Match("/wp-login.php?redirect_to=/wp-admin") {
t.Error("带查询串的 wp-login.php 应被匹配")
}
}
func TestExtraPaths(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true, ExtraPaths: []string{"/secret-backdoor"}})
if !h.Match("/secret-backdoor") {
t.Error("自定义诱饵路径应被匹配")
}
if !h.Match("/secret-backdoor/x.php") {
t.Error("自定义诱饵路径的子路径应被匹配")
}
}
func TestExtractCredentialsForm(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/wp-login.php",
strings.NewReader("log=admin&pwd=admin123&redirect_to=%2Fwp-admin%2F&wp-submit=Log+In"))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
creds := h.ExtractCredentials(req)
if creds.Username != "admin" {
t.Errorf("Username = %q, want admin", creds.Username)
}
if creds.Password != "admin123" {
t.Errorf("Password = %q, want admin123", creds.Password)
}
if !creds.HadFields {
t.Error("HadFields = false, want true")
}
}
func TestExtractCredentialsJSON(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/wp-login.php",
strings.NewReader(`{"username":"root","password":"toor","extra":1}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
creds := h.ExtractCredentials(req)
if creds.Username != "root" {
t.Errorf("Username = %q, want root", creds.Username)
}
if creds.Password != "toor" {
t.Errorf("Password = %q, want toor", creds.Password)
}
}
func TestExtractCredentialsQuery(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/wp-login.php?log=admin&pwd=secret", nil)
creds := h.ExtractCredentials(req)
if creds.Username != "admin" || creds.Password != "secret" {
t.Errorf("got %q/%q, want admin/secret", creds.Username, creds.Password)
}
}
func TestExtractCredentialsBasicAuth(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/wp-admin", nil)
req.SetBasicAuth("admin", "hunter2")
creds := h.ExtractCredentials(req)
if creds.Username != "admin" || creds.Password != "hunter2" {
t.Errorf("got %q/%q, want admin/hunter2", creds.Username, creds.Password)
}
}
func TestExtractCredentialsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/wp-admin", nil)
creds := h.ExtractCredentials(req)
if creds.HadFields {
t.Error("空请求不应标记为携带凭据")
}
}
func TestExtractCredentialsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
h := New(Options{Enabled: true})
// 畸形 body 不应 panic
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/wp-login.php",
strings.NewReader("%zz&log=admin&&=="))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
creds := h.ExtractCredentials(req)
if creds.Username != "admin" {
t.Errorf("Username = %q, want admin(畸形 body 仍应尽量提取)", creds.Username)
}
}
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package honeypot
import (
"html"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// LoginPageVars 是假登录页的渲染参数。
type LoginPageVars struct {
// Action 是表单提交地址(当前诱饵路径本身)。
Action string
// Title / Heading 是页面标题与表单标题。
Title string
Heading string
// Notice 是提交失败后的提示语。
Notice string
// Redir 为原始请求的查询串(WordPress 风格的 ?redirect_to=),原样回填。
Redir string
}
// RenderLoginPage 输出仿 WordPress 后台风格的假登录页(200,text/html)。
//
// 页面刻意包含:
// - 隐藏 canary 标记(HTML 注释 + meta),便于日后溯源;
// - 经典 WP 字段名 log / pwd / redirect_to —— 让暴力破解脚本原样提交,
// 我们就能拿到最干净的用户名与密码对;
// - 一个 nginx/Apache 风格的 404 页脚,暗示「这个后台真的存在」,
// 但正文是纯静态 HTML,不泄露任何版本、路径或真实凭据。
func RenderLoginPage(vars LoginPageVars) []byte {
action := html.EscapeString(vars.Action)
title := vars.Title
if title == "" {
title = "Log In ‹ WordPress"
}
heading := vars.Heading
if heading == "" {
heading = "WordPress"
}
notice := ""
if vars.Notice != "" {
notice = `<div id="login_error">` + html.EscapeString(vars.Notice) + `</div>`
}
redir := html.EscapeString(vars.Redir)
var b strings.Builder
b.Grow(4096)
b.WriteString(`<!DOCTYPE html>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<!-- canary: ` + CanaryToken + ` -->` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<html lang="en-US">` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<head>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<meta charset="UTF-8" />` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<meta name="generator" content="TamaBox honeypot ` + CanaryToken + `" />` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<title>` + html.EscapeString(title) + `</title>` + "\n")
// 静态内联样式,避免蜜罐依赖站点静态资源(也避免污染真实缓存)
b.WriteString(`<style>` + honeypotCSS + `</style>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`</head>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<body class="login">` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<div id="login">` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<h1><a href="` + action + `" title="` + html.EscapeString(heading) + `">` + html.EscapeString(heading) + `</a></h1>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(notice + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<form name="loginform" id="loginform" action="` + action + `" method="post" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded">` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<p><label for="user_login">Username<br /><input type="text" name="log" id="user_login" class="input" value="" size="20" autocapitalize="off" autocomplete="username" /></label></p>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<p><label for="user_pass">Password<br /><input type="password" name="pwd" id="user_pass" class="input" value="" size="20" autocomplete="current-password" /></label></p>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<p class="forgetmenot"><input name="rememberme" type="checkbox" id="rememberme" value="forever" /> Remember Me</p>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<p class="submit"><input type="submit" name="wp-submit" id="wp-submit" class="button button-primary button-large" value="Log In" /></p>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<input type="hidden" name="redirect_to" value="` + redir + `" />` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<input type="hidden" name="testcookie" value="1" />` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`</form>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<p id="nav"><a href="` + action + `?action=lostpassword">Lost your password?</a> | <a href="` + action + `?action=register">Register</a></p>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`</div>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`<div id="footer"><p>` + html.EscapeString(NotFoundFooter) + `</p></div>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`</body>` + "\n")
b.WriteString(`</html>` + "\n")
return []byte(b.String())
}
const honeypotCSS = `html{background:#f0f0f1}body{margin:0;padding:0;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,sans-serif;font-size:14px;color:#3c434a}
#login{border:1px solid #dcdcde;background:#fff;width:320px;margin:5em auto;padding:26px 24px 46px;box-shadow:0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,.04)}
#login h1{text-align:center;margin:0 0 1em;font-size:24px;font-weight:400}
#login h1 a{color:#444;text-decoration:none}
#login form{margin-top:16px}
#login label{display:block;font-size:14px}
#login input[type=text],#login input[type=password]{width:100%;padding:5px 8px;border:1px solid #ddd;border-radius:3px;box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:4px}
#login .button{width:100%;padding:7px 12px;background:#2271b1;border:1px solid #2271b1;border-radius:3px;color:#fff;cursor:pointer;font-size:13px}
#login .submit{margin:16px 0 0}
#login_error{border-left:4px solid #d63638;background:#fcf0f1;padding:10px 12px;margin:12px 0}
#nav,.forgetmenot{font-size:13px;color:#50575e}
#footer{text-align:center;color:#646970;font-size:12px;margin:24px auto;max-width:320px}
`
// NotFoundFooter 是 404 假页脚,用于给扫描器「后台存在但资源不存在」的错觉。
const NotFoundFooter = "The requested resource was not found on this server."
// LoginFailureNotice 是提交凭据后的统一提示(不区分「用户不存在」与「密码错误」,
// 避免因响应差异让爆破脚本调整策略;同时这也是虚假后台「存在」的证据)。
const LoginFailureNotice = "ERROR: Invalid username or password."
// WriteLoginPage 将假登录页写入响应。
func WriteLoginPage(w http.ResponseWriter, vars LoginPageVars) {
body := RenderLoginPage(vars)
h := w.Header()
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate")
// 诱饵页面绝不进入任何共享/边缘缓存,也不被中间层改写。
h.Set("X-Robots-Tag", "noindex, nofollow")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write(body)
}