chore: baseline snapshot before moderation-strictness feature

Repo .git was damaged (refs/ missing, index truncated, object store near-empty). Repaired via git init (rebuilt refs), stale index preserved as .git/index.corrupt-20260910.bak, then full worktree committed as a rollback baseline.
2026-09-10 10:56:27 +08:00
commit e3e59e7c69
296 changed files with 67458 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// Copyright 2022 E99p1ant. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package censor
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+type ForbiddenType string
+
+const (
+	ForbiddenTypeSpam        ForbiddenType = "spam"
+	ForbiddenTypeAd          ForbiddenType = "ad"
+	ForbiddenTypePolitics    ForbiddenType = "politics"
+	ForbiddenTypeTerrorism   ForbiddenType = "terrorism"
+	ForbiddenTypeAbuse       ForbiddenType = "abuse"
+	ForbiddenTypePorn        ForbiddenType = "porn"
+	ForbiddenTypeFlood       ForbiddenType = "flood"
+	ForbiddenTypeContraband  ForbiddenType = "contraband"
+	ForbiddenTypeMeaningless ForbiddenType = "meaningless"
+	ForbiddenTypeHarmful     ForbiddenType = "harmful"
+)
+
+func (f ForbiddenType) String() string {
+	return map[ForbiddenType]string{
+		ForbiddenTypeSpam:        "含垃圾信息",
+		ForbiddenTypeAd:          "广告",
+		ForbiddenTypePolitics:    "涉政",
+		ForbiddenTypeTerrorism:   "暴恐",
+		ForbiddenTypeAbuse:       "辱骂",
+		ForbiddenTypePorn:        "色情",
+		ForbiddenTypeFlood:       "灌水",
+		ForbiddenTypeContraband:  "违禁",
+		ForbiddenTypeMeaningless: "无意义",
+		ForbiddenTypeHarmful:     "不良场景",
+	}[f]
+}
+
+type TextCensorResponse struct {
+	SourceName    string          `json:"source_name"`
+	Pass          bool            `json:"pass"`
+	ForbiddenType ForbiddenType   `json:"forbidden_type"`
+	Hint          string          `json:"hint"`
+	Confidence    float64         `json:"confidence"`
+	RawResponse   json.RawMessage `json:"raw_response"`
+}
+
+func (r *TextCensorResponse) ToJSON() []byte {
+	jsonBytes, _ := json.Marshal(r)
+	return jsonBytes
+}
+
+func (r *TextCensorResponse) ErrorMessage() string {
+	errorMessage := "内容安全检查不通过"
+	if r.ForbiddenType != "" {
+		errorMessage += fmt.Sprintf(" [%s]", r.ForbiddenType.String())
+	}
+	if r.Hint != "" {
+		errorMessage += fmt.Sprintf("，相关标签：%q", r.Hint)
+	}
+	return errorMessage
+}
+
+type TextCensor interface {
+	Censor(ctx context.Context, text string) (*TextCensorResponse, error)
+	String() string
+}
+
+var TrustedHosts = []string{
+	"xhslink.com", // 小红书
+	"weibo.com",   // 微博
+	"b23.tv",      // Bilibili
+	"acfun.cn",
+	"aixifan.com",
+	"github.com",
+	// 自有域名：旧域 tama.guru 保留至 2026-12 到期前的过渡期结束，
+	// 期间用户分享的旧链接仍需视为可信（不被判为广告）；新域 shiroko.one 为主域。
+	"tama.guru",
+	"shiroko.one",
+	"337845818.best",
+	"x.com",
+	"bilibili.com",
+}
+
+// RemoveTrustedURL removes the trusted URL from the text,
+// in order to bypass the URL censoring.
+// 仅当可信域名后紧跟路径分隔符（/ ? #）或位于字符串结尾时才视为可信，
+// 避免 github.com.evil.tld 被朴素替换误判为 github.com 之子域而漏审。
+func RemoveTrustedURL(str string) string {
+	for _, host := range TrustedHosts {
+		for _, protocol := range []string{"http://", "https://"} {
+			needle := protocol + host
+			var b strings.Builder
+			rest := str
+			for {
+				idx := strings.Index(rest, needle)
+				if idx < 0 {
+					b.WriteString(rest)
+					break
+				}
+				b.WriteString(rest[:idx])
+				after := rest[idx+len(needle):]
+				if len(after) == 0 || after[0] == '/' || after[0] == '?' || after[0] == '#' {
+					// 可信域名边界：跳过该前缀，从域名之后继续（域名本身被移除，不进入审核）。
+					rest = after
+				} else {
+					// 非可信域名边界（如 github.com.evil）：保留前缀，从其后继续扫描。
+					b.WriteString(needle)
+					rest = after
+				}
+			}
+			str = b.String()
+		}
+	}
+	return str
+}