审阅蜜罐邮件提醒功能发现的问题,三项一并修: 1. autoban.alerted 从 map[string]bool(永不过期)改为带时间戳的 map[string]time.Time,冷却期 24h 与蜜罐侧对齐。cleanup 里清理过期项, 长期盯防同一来源不再漏掉后续攻击活动(此前一生只报一次)。 2. 蜜罐告警在 security_alert_email 为空时短路:route.go 注入 sendAlert 前判空,收件人缺失置 nil,避免每次凭据提交白做 SMTP 拨号 + 刷 Warn。 3. 强化 security_alert_email 的配置警示(蜜罐邮件含明文密码, 必须是个人邮箱、禁群组/分发列表)。
270 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
270 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
package autoban
|
||
|
||
import (
|
||
"sync/atomic"
|
||
"testing"
|
||
"time"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
func newTestBanner(thresholdSensitive, threshold404 int, window, duration time.Duration, alertEmail string, alertCalls *int64) *Banner {
|
||
return New(Options{
|
||
Enabled: true,
|
||
TrackNotFound: true, // 测试 helper 显式开启 404 跟踪,覆盖两种计数的既有用例
|
||
ThresholdSensitive: thresholdSensitive,
|
||
Threshold404: threshold404,
|
||
Window: window,
|
||
Duration: duration,
|
||
AlertEmail: alertEmail,
|
||
SendAlert: func(ip string, paths []string, dur int) error {
|
||
if alertCalls != nil {
|
||
atomic.AddInt64(alertCalls, 1)
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestSensitiveThreshold(t *testing.T) {
|
||
b := newTestBanner(2, 5, time.Minute, time.Minute, "", nil)
|
||
b.Record("1.2.3.4", "/admin", KindSensitive)
|
||
if b.IsBanned("1.2.3.4") {
|
||
t.Fatal("should not be banned before reaching threshold")
|
||
}
|
||
b.Record("1.2.3.4", "/.env", KindSensitive)
|
||
if !b.IsBanned("1.2.3.4") {
|
||
t.Fatal("expected ban after reaching sensitive threshold")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestNotFoundThreshold(t *testing.T) {
|
||
b := newTestBanner(10, 3, time.Minute, time.Minute, "", nil)
|
||
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
|
||
b.Record("5.6.7.8", "/random-"+string(rune('a'+i)), KindNotFound)
|
||
}
|
||
if !b.IsBanned("5.6.7.8") {
|
||
t.Fatal("expected ban after reaching 404 threshold")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestNotFoundTrackDisabledByDefault(t *testing.T) {
|
||
// 默认(TrackNotFound=false)下 404 不参与统计:正常业务路径一律放行,
|
||
// 仅敏感扫描路径仍计数封禁——防止共享出口下正常访问被 404 探测连坐误伤。
|
||
b := New(Options{Enabled: true, ThresholdSensitive: 1, Threshold404: 1, Window: time.Minute, Duration: time.Minute})
|
||
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
|
||
b.Record("7.7.7.7", "/random-"+string(rune('a'+i)), KindNotFound)
|
||
}
|
||
if b.IsBanned("7.7.7.7") {
|
||
t.Fatal("404 events must not accumulate when TrackNotFound is false")
|
||
}
|
||
b.Record("7.7.7.7", "/.env", KindSensitive)
|
||
if !b.IsBanned("7.7.7.7") {
|
||
t.Fatal("sensitive events must still ban even when 404 tracking is off")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestWindowExpiry(t *testing.T) {
|
||
b := newTestBanner(2, 5, 50*time.Millisecond, time.Minute, "", nil)
|
||
b.Record("1.1.1.1", "/admin", KindSensitive)
|
||
time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond) // 事件滑出窗口
|
||
b.Record("1.1.1.1", "/.env", KindSensitive)
|
||
if b.IsBanned("1.1.1.1") {
|
||
t.Fatal("events outside the window must not accumulate")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestDurationExpiry(t *testing.T) {
|
||
b := newTestBanner(1, 5, time.Minute, 60*time.Millisecond, "", nil)
|
||
b.Record("2.2.2.2", "/admin", KindSensitive)
|
||
if !b.IsBanned("2.2.2.2") {
|
||
t.Fatal("expected ban")
|
||
}
|
||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) // 封禁到期
|
||
if b.IsBanned("2.2.2.2") {
|
||
t.Fatal("ban should expire after duration")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestAlertOncePerIP(t *testing.T) {
|
||
var calls int64
|
||
b := newTestBanner(1, 5, time.Minute, time.Minute, "[email protected]", &calls)
|
||
b.Record("9.9.9.9", "/wp-admin", KindSensitive)
|
||
b.Record("9.9.9.9", "/.git", KindSensitive) // 已在封禁中,不应重复告警
|
||
b.Record("9.9.9.9", "/config", KindSensitive)
|
||
|
||
// sendAlert 异步调用,轮询等待最多 500ms
|
||
deadline := time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)
|
||
for atomic.LoadInt64(&calls) == 0 && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
||
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
|
||
}
|
||
if got := atomic.LoadInt64(&calls); got != 1 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 alert, got %d", got)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestAlertCooldownExpires 回归「告警冷却期」而非「一生只发一次」:
|
||
// 冷却期(alertCooldown = 24h)过后,同一来源再次触发封禁应能再告警。
|
||
//
|
||
// 早先是 map[string]bool 永久去重,长期盯防同一来源会漏掉后续攻击活动
|
||
// (换路径再来、隔几天再来都收不到提醒)。这里直接回拨 alerted 的时间戳,
|
||
// 模拟「冷却期已过」,断言能再次发出告警。
|
||
func TestAlertCooldownExpires(t *testing.T) {
|
||
var calls int64
|
||
b := newTestBanner(1, 5, time.Minute, time.Minute, "[email protected]", &calls)
|
||
|
||
// 第一次封禁 + 告警
|
||
b.Record("8.8.8.8", "/admin", KindSensitive)
|
||
waitFor(&calls, 1, t)
|
||
|
||
// 冷却期内再次命中:不应重复告警(此时已在封禁中,先手动解除封禁以走到告警判定)
|
||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||
delete(b.banned, "8.8.8.8")
|
||
b.mu.Unlock()
|
||
b.Record("8.8.8.8", "/config", KindSensitive)
|
||
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
|
||
if got := atomic.LoadInt64(&calls); got != 1 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("冷却期内不应重复告警,got %d", got)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 回拨 alerted 时间戳到冷却期之前,模拟「24 小时后攻击者再来」
|
||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||
b.alerted["8.8.8.8"] = time.Now().Add(-alertCooldown - time.Minute)
|
||
delete(b.banned, "8.8.8.8")
|
||
b.mu.Unlock()
|
||
b.Record("8.8.8.8", "/.env", KindSensitive)
|
||
|
||
waitFor(&calls, 2, t)
|
||
if got := atomic.LoadInt64(&calls); got != 2 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("冷却期过后应再次告警,got %d", got)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// waitFor 轮询等待 atomic 计数器达到 want(sendAlert 是异步 goroutine)。
|
||
func waitFor(c *int64, want int64, t *testing.T) {
|
||
t.Helper()
|
||
deadline := time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)
|
||
for atomic.LoadInt64(c) < want && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
||
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestDisabled(t *testing.T) {
|
||
b := New(Options{Enabled: false})
|
||
b.Record("3.3.3.3", "/admin", KindSensitive)
|
||
if b.IsBanned("3.3.3.3") {
|
||
t.Fatal("disabled auto-ban must not ban")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
|
||
b := New(Options{Enabled: true}) // 全部走默认值
|
||
if b.thresholdSensitive != DefaultThresholdSensitive || b.threshold404 != DefaultThreshold404 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("default thresholds wrong: %d/%d", b.thresholdSensitive, b.threshold404)
|
||
}
|
||
if b.window != DefaultWindowSeconds*time.Second || b.duration != DefaultDurationMinutes*time.Minute {
|
||
t.Fatalf("default window/duration wrong: %v/%v", b.window, b.duration)
|
||
}
|
||
if b.trackNotFound {
|
||
t.Fatal("404 tracking must be disabled by default")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestIsSensitivePath(t *testing.T) {
|
||
cases := []struct {
|
||
path string
|
||
want bool
|
||
}{
|
||
{"/admin", true},
|
||
{"/admin/panel", true},
|
||
{"/WP-ADMIN", true},
|
||
{"/.env", true},
|
||
{"/user/questions", false},
|
||
{"/vote/abc123", false},
|
||
{"/administratorx", false}, // 前缀必须完整段匹配,避免误伤
|
||
// 目录枚举 / 双斜杠变体(wlwmanifest 扫描):前缀匹配漏网,片段匹配兜底
|
||
{"//wp/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml", true},
|
||
{"//news/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml", true},
|
||
{"//2018/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml", true},
|
||
{"//shop/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml", true},
|
||
{"//test/xmlrpc.php", true},
|
||
{"/blog/wp-json/", true},
|
||
{"/wp-content/uploads/evil.php", true},
|
||
// 业务路径不得被片段匹配误伤
|
||
{"/_/tamakyi", false},
|
||
{"/_/admin6", false},
|
||
{"/api/v1/question/abc123", false},
|
||
{"/explore/tags/golang", false},
|
||
{"/i18n/zh-CN", false},
|
||
}
|
||
for _, c := range cases {
|
||
if got := IsSensitivePath(c.path); got != c.want {
|
||
t.Errorf("IsSensitivePath(%q) = %v, want %v", c.path, got, c.want)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestOnBanCallback 验证建封时会回调上层(键 / 时长 / 原因),
|
||
// 且「已在封禁期内重复命中」不会重复回调。
|
||
//
|
||
// 存在的意义:封禁表是纯内存的,外部完全看不见。线上出现过
|
||
// 「邮件说封了、实际还能访问」,而当时没有任何记录能说明封的是哪个键、
|
||
// 到什么时候解除 —— 这个回调就是那条记录的唯一来源。
|
||
func TestOnBanCallback(t *testing.T) {
|
||
type banEvent struct {
|
||
key string
|
||
duration time.Duration
|
||
reason string
|
||
}
|
||
events := make(chan banEvent, 4)
|
||
b := New(Options{
|
||
Enabled: true,
|
||
ThresholdSensitive: 1,
|
||
TrackNotFound: false,
|
||
Window: time.Minute,
|
||
Duration: 10 * time.Minute,
|
||
HoneypotEnabled: true,
|
||
HoneypotThreshold: 1,
|
||
HoneypotDuration: 24 * time.Hour,
|
||
OnBan: func(key string, duration time.Duration, reason string) {
|
||
events <- banEvent{key: key, duration: duration, reason: reason}
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
const key = "2408:8207:1234:5678::/64"
|
||
if !b.RecordHoneypot(key, "/wp-login.php") {
|
||
t.Fatal("首次蜜罐命中应触发封禁")
|
||
}
|
||
select {
|
||
case e := <-events:
|
||
if e.key != key {
|
||
t.Errorf("回调键 = %q, want %q", e.key, key)
|
||
}
|
||
if e.duration != 24*time.Hour {
|
||
t.Errorf("回调时长 = %v, want 24h(蜜罐应走 HoneypotDuration)", e.duration)
|
||
}
|
||
if e.reason != ReasonHoneypot {
|
||
t.Errorf("回调原因 = %q, want %q", e.reason, ReasonHoneypot)
|
||
}
|
||
case <-time.After(time.Second):
|
||
t.Fatal("蜜罐封禁没有触发 OnBan 回调")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 已在封禁期内再次命中:不新建封禁,也就不应重复回调。
|
||
b.RecordHoneypot(key, "/wp-login.php")
|
||
select {
|
||
case e := <-events:
|
||
t.Fatalf("重复命中不应重复回调,收到 %+v", e)
|
||
case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 常规通道(敏感路径)也要回调,且时长用常规 Duration、原因可区分。
|
||
b.Record("1.2.3.4", "/admin", KindSensitive)
|
||
select {
|
||
case e := <-events:
|
||
if e.key != "1.2.3.4" || e.reason != ReasonProbe || e.duration != 10*time.Minute {
|
||
t.Errorf("常规封禁回调 = %+v, want key=1.2.3.4 reason=probe duration=10m", e)
|
||
}
|
||
case <-time.After(time.Second):
|
||
t.Fatal("常规封禁没有触发 OnBan 回调")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|